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I. THE TWO BLACKSTONES
 At various times in their work, Goldberg and Zipursky invoke 
Blackstone, or a Blackstonian conception of private law, to support 
their argument that torts are best understood as wrongs. The view 
held by Goldberg and Zipursky, which I generally support, is com-
plex, but this sentence near the end of their article Torts as Wrongs
captures the Blackstonian essence of their theory: “[T]he idea of civil 
recourse . . . is a political commitment to the following effect: Indi-
viduals who are able to prove that someone has treated them in a 
manner that the legal system counts as a relational, injurious wrong
shall have the authority to hold the wrongdoer accountable to him.”1
Later they say that “[i]t is no accident that seminal figures in our 
constitutional tradition, including Coke, Locke, and Blackstone, 
deemed individuals to enjoy a right of recourse against those who 
wronged them and deemed governments to be obligated to provide an 
avenue by which to exercise this right.”2 Goldberg and Zipursky’s in-
vocation of Blackstone is not merely to draw support for their theory 
from a certain, historically grounded constitutional tradition; rather, 
as in their earlier work, Goldberg and Zipursky rely on Blackstone to 
support their interpretation of the analytic structure of tort law as a 
common law practice.3
 Therefore, it seems from the foregoing that Blackstone would sup-
port legal institutions that would assist individuals to secure legal 
recourse. It is impossible and pointless to predict what Blackstone 
would have said about various contemporary debates over the provi-
sion of legal aid in civil cases; that is not the point of this Article. We 
do know that Blackstone did have strong views about the practices of 
assignment, maintenance, and champerty: he strongly opposed 
                                                          
?  Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Visiting Professor of Law, 
Columbia Law School. I would like to give many thanks to Professor Curtis Bridgeman for 
organizing the Symposium on Civil Recourse Theory at which this Article was first 
presented and to Professors John Goldberg and Ben Zipursky for their patience with me as 
I worked out my views on their theory of torts as wrongs.
 1.    John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV.
917, 974 (2010) (emphasis added).
 2.    Id. at 982.
 3.    Their reliance on Blackstone is made clear and explicit early in Torts as Wrongs:
“As its name indicates, tort law is about wrongs. The law of torts is a law of wrongs and 
recourse—what Blackstone called ‘private wrongs.’ ” Id. at 918.
210 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol 39:209
them.4 This somewhat obscure fact has been recalled and emphasized 
in recent public communications by the American Tort Reform Asso-
ciation and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, who have reached back 
to Blackstone to reinforce their argument that any form of third-
party investment in litigation should be viewed with skepticism, if 
not hostility, by lawyers and legislators.5
 As explained by numerous courts, “Put simply, maintenance is 
helping another prosecute a suit; champerty is maintaining a suit in 
return for a financial interest in the outcome; and barratry is a con-
tinuing practice of maintenance or champerty.”6 The modern trend 
among many courts is to abolish these causes of action because they 
have been supplanted by modern tort actions such as malicious pros-
ecution and abuse of process, as well as by the code of professional 
responsibility for attorneys.7 For the purpose of this Article, the tech-
nical distinctions between assignment, maintenance, and champerty 
are unimportant.8 I will focus on the public wrong of maintenance, 
which Blackstone defined as “intermeddling in a suit that no way be-
longs to one.”9 Blackstone was unrestrained in what this meant: any 
act on the part of a stranger to a lawsuit that had the effect of aiding 
the suit. Blackstone quoted from ancient Roman law sources to sug-
gest that the aid need not be monetary—it could be merely informa-
tional. It is, in his mind, a public wrong even to supply witnesses to a 
person in whose suit one had no interest.10 Nor did Blackstone make 
any distinctions between supporting an ongoing suit and instigating 
a suit. All were forms of intermeddling; and, all were prohibited ex-
cept in cases where the object of the aid was “[a] kinsman, [a] serv-
ant, or [a] poor neighbor [for reasons of charity].”11 It was an “offence 
against public justice” to assist a stranger’s suit, and according to 
                                                          
 4.    See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134-36.
 5.    Darren McKinney, Letter to the Editor, Lawsuit Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/23/opinion/lweb23loans.html; see JOHN BEISNER, JESSICA 
MILLER & GARY RUBIN, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SELLING LAWSUITS,
BUYING TROUBLE: THIRD PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES passim (2009).
 6.   Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P’ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 273 (S.C. 2000) (alteration in 
original) (quoting In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 424 n.15 (1978)).
 7.    See Sec. Underground Storage, Inc. v. Anderson, 347 F.2d 964, 969 (10th Cir. 
1965) (interpreting Kansas law); Hardick v. Homol, 795 So. 2d 1107, 1110-12 (Fla. 5th DCA 
2001) (citing Alexander v. Unification Church of Am., 634 F.2d 673, 677 (2d Cir. 1980)) 
(interpreting New York law); Tosi v. Jones, 685 N.E.2d 580, 583 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); see 
also Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (Mass. 1997) (citing Rice v. Farrell, 28
A.2d 7 (Conn. 1942)).
 8.    For a more detailed exploration of the differences and similarities between the 
historical treatment of assignment, maintenance, and champerty in American law, see 
Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61 (2011).
 9.    BLACKSTONE, supra note 4, at *134-35.
 10.    Id. at *135.
 11.    Id.
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Blackstone, even the Romans made it a crime to “support another’s 
lawsuit, by money, witnesses, or patronage.”12
 It is important to recognize that Blackstone’s view reflected a 
more general hostility towards litigation that may have pervaded the 
early common law.13 According to Stephen Presser, “litigation was 
something of an evil,” and “[a] litigious society . . . was a fractured 
society.”14 This attitude changed when the “[s]hame of [l]itigation” 
(the traditional common law view) was replaced by the “[r]omance of 
[l]itigation.”15 The success of the civil rights movement in the 1950s 
and 1960s changed the centuries-old social prejudice against litiga-
tion. Even garden-variety personal injury litigation was now seen not 
as “a social evil but a form of political expression and, in particular, 
an avenue for plaintiffs (the ‘aggrieved’) to learn of and to ‘effectuate’ 
‘legal rights.’ ”16 In 1964, the American Bar Association noted that 
the view that “litigation, per se, is bad has been replaced by the view 
that litigation is a socially useful way to resolve disputes, particular-
ly the injury claims arising [from] our mechanized society.”17
 Because litigation was an evil to be avoided, the common law 
adopted multiple mechanisms to express its disapproval of those who 
would excite unnecessary litigation, including strict bans on mainte-
nance and champerty.18 The Blackstonian account suggests a straight 
line of hostility extending from Rome until the late twentieth centu-
ry, when U.S. courts developed the view that litigation was no longer 
a social evil and that anything, short of fraud, which promoted legit-
imate claiming was a good thing. The historical truth is more com-
plex, and it offers almost no support for the idea that Blackstone’s 
views were accepted in the United States. The Romans were much 
more comfortable with third-party involvement in litigation than 
medieval England, which was very much influenced by the “Chris-
tian attitude that litigation was itself something to be discouraged.”19
By the time the American colonies split from England, the laws of 
                                                          
 12.    Id. at *134-35.
 13.    See, e.g., BEISNER, MILLER & RUBIN, supra note 5, at 2 (explaining that third-
party litigation financing was not allowed at common law); Stephen B. Presser, A Tale of 
Two Models: Third Party Litigation in Historical and Ideological Perspective 1-4
(Third Party Fin. of Litig. Roundtable, Searle Ctr., Northwestern. Univ. Law Sch. Sept. 
24–25, 2009), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/papers/ 
Presser_A_Tale_of_Two_Models.pdf.
 14.    Presser, supra note 13, at 3-4 (emphasis omitted).
 15.    Id. at 5-9.
 16.    Stephen C. Yeazell, Brown, The Civil Rights Movement, and the Silent Litigation 
Revolution, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 1990 (2004).
 17.    F.B. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 210 (1964).
 18.    Presser, supra note 13, at 4. 
 19.  Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 56 (1936). 
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maintenance, which Max Radin called “the last flaring up of feudal-
ism,” were already on the decline on both sides of the Atlantic.20
 Radin’s theory as to why medieval English common law had such 
a hostile attitude towards litigation, even nonfrivolous litigation, was 
twofold. First, litigiousness was “an indication of a quarrelsome and 
un-Christian spirit.”21 Second, since litigation was not absolutely nec-
essary and was most likely motivated by a desire for profit, it would 
have been disfavored, because “in medieval eyes [it] was tainted with 
that speculation which was the essence of the abhorred sin of usury.”22
 These explanations offer very little support to the Blackstonian 
position. Radin suspected that even in England, by the time Black-
stone and Coke wrote, the role played by so-called Christian attitudes 
towards litigation had become part of the “psychological background” 
with which lawyers approached new and unfamiliar legal innova-
tions, such as the assignment of choses in action and the rise of an 
entrepreneurial legal class.23 Radin did not deny that the professed 
hostility of some members of the legal profession to litigation and, 
more specifically, third-party investment in litigation was a genuine 
reaction to changes in the economic order of the day.24 It is easy, in 
fact, to see how neatly the economic principles behind maintenance 
fit with the emerging capitalist United States. Even in 1936, Radin 
could see the connection between the United States’ commitment to 
private property and free markets, and the phenomenon of third-
party involvement in litigation: 
 A claim in litigation is often as such a valuable piece of property 
. . . . To acquire a share in such a claim is essentially a speculation 
and in the Middle Ages [was] tainted with the discredit which at-
tached to every form of speculation.  
 . . . . 
 . . . Speculation in the United States never had the continuous 
history of slight moral obliquity which it retained in England . . . .25
                                                          
 20.    Id. 56-65.
 21.    Id. at 58 (“Vexatiousness, accordingly, consisted not merely in using legal process 
unjustifiably, but also in using it excessively, even when it was justified, or in using it all 
except under the pressure of necessity. A man . . . had no business to intermeddle with the 
interest or wrongs of some one else.”).
 22.    Id. at 60-61. Radin pointed out that the term “champerty” was derived from the 
concept in property law of tenure by champart, which was a form of tenancy by which a 
landowner shared ownership with the tenant and received a portion of the harvest but took 
the risk that there may be no return at all (the tenant, in turn, had an obligation to work 
the land or risk forfeiture). Id. at 61. Radin argued that tenancy in champart was imported 
into the Statute of Westminster II, which was the one of the earliest legal prohibition of 
third-party support of litigation, in order to apply to a new context a familiar concept. Id.
at 61-62.
 23.    Id. at 68.
 24.    Id. at 65 (The law prohibiting “[c]hamperty . . . had its source in the resistance to 
the slowly growing capitalism that followed the Renaissance.”).
 25.    Id. at 69-70.
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 The story of the rise of modern tort law and its deep relationship 
with the rise of capitalism and the market economy has been told 
many times.26 The connection between the right to property and lib-
eralism is deep and goes back to Locke, if not further.27 Central to 
Goldberg and Zipursky’s account of torts as wrongs is their concep-
tion of torts as a mechanism for members of a liberal state to secure 
redress for the violation of certain rights they possess as citizens.28
Why, then, would Blackstone not clearly have embraced a market in 
lawsuits if, as was occurring throughout the larger economy, markets 
were developing in land and other valuable social interests? One par-
tial answer might be that the Blackstonian conception of a private 
right to redress lacked some essential element of “propertyness.” 
There is some support for this view, although it does not come direct-
ly from Blackstone.29 As Goldberg has shown in great detail, Ameri-
can courts have been deeply ambivalent, if not hostile, to the idea 
that the “right to redress” itself must be treated as property under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.30
 There is a tension between Blackstone’s opposition to maintenance 
and his view of torts as wrongs, which the state is obliged to allow 
citizens to redress. On the one hand, it would seem that were Black-
stone serious about the view that torts are private wrongs, he would 
be glad if they were redressed, regardless of who initiated the redress 
or why—that is, he would be indifferent to the profit motive of third 
parties. On the other hand, he clearly disapproved of third parties 
initiating redress except under the most limited of circumstances. 
His stated reason—that to do so would “stir up” discord—seems 
strangely sentimental, and it cannot survive the shift from a precapi-
talist, Christian society to a capitalist society in which markets and 
liberty are seen as the foundations of liberal society. 
 What is not obvious is whether the tension ripens into a contradic-
tion, and if it does, whether that contradiction tells us anything in-
teresting about Goldberg and Zipursky’s theory of torts as wrongs. I 
will argue in this Article that Blackstone’s views are contradictory 
but that the modern civil recourse theorist can easily repudiate 
Blackstone’s views on maintenance while preserving their genetic 
link to Blackstone’s private law theory. However, I will try to show, 
                                                          
 26.    See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1780–1860 (1977); Gary T. Schwartz, The Character of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA
L. REV. 641 (1989).
 27.    See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, 51 FLA. L.
REV. 1, 7 (1999).
 28.    Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 982-83. 
 29.  See, e.g., Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution 
in Nineteenth-Century State Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 57 (1999). 
 30.    John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the 
Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005).
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in the course of making this second argument, that the theory of torts 
as wrongs needs to be sharpened. I will argue that the “mistreat-
ment” of victims—an interpretation by Goldberg and Zipursky of how 
tort law understands the defendant’s conduct—refers not to any sub-
jective experience of mistreatment by the victim, but to the victim’s 
belief, whether subjective or counterfactual, that a rule of the legal 
system has been mistreated and that her feeling of mistreatment is 
relevant only to the extent that she resents the wrongdoer’s lack of 
respect of the law.  
II. THE IGNORANT VICTIM
 I want to begin with an example that I hope will illustrate why 
Blackstone’s antimaintenance approach might be a plausible extension 
of his views on private law. This example is a highly stylized version 
of an actual case decided by a federal court in Nevada in 2009.31
State S has a consumer protection statute (Law L) that requires all 
commercial homebuilders to construct homes “without defects.” 
Homeowner bought his house from Builder and noticed within one 
year that the stucco was cracking. He was annoyed, but was not 
sure why it was cracking and did not do anything. He did not know 
about Law L. Six months after Homeowner noticed the stucco 
cracking he received the following offer from Inspector. Inspector 
offered to inspect Homeowner’s house for free to see if Homeowner 
could claim under Law L. If Inspector found something, he would 
tell Homeowner, and if Homeowner used that information for any 
legal action that resulted in a positive outcome for Homeowner, In-
spector would receive payment for his inspection from the damages 
Homeowner would receive from Builder. If there was nothing 
wrong with Homeowner’s home, or if Homeowner chose not to take 
action under Law L, then Inspector would receive nothing for his 
labor. Inspector inspected the home, determined that the cracked 
stucco was a defect under Law L, and told Homeowner. Homeown-
er brought an action under Law L, received compensation from 
Builder, and Inspector received $1000 for his inspection work.  
According to Blackstone, Inspector committed a public wrong. It is 
important to see that Inspector did not lie to Homeowner, and In-
spector did not induce Homeowner to make a frivolous claim against 
Builder. Nor did Inspector engage in malicious prosecution (which is 
also known as the “Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings”) or abuse of 
process.32 The claim the Inspector induced against Builder was a val-
                                                          
 31.    Del Webb Cmtys., Inc. v. Partington, No. 2:08-cv-00571-RCJ-GWF, 2009 U.S. Dist 
LEXIS 85616, at *3-4 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2009), aff’d in part, vacated in part 652 F.3d 1145 
(9th Cir. 2011).
 32.    See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 30 (1977).  
One who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation or procurement of 
civil proceedings against another is subject to liability to the other for wrongful 
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id claim; that is, under Law L, Builder had wronged Homeowner, and 
but for Inspector’s aid, Homeowner would not have been aware that 
he had been wronged by Builder. It should not matter that the wrong 
is based on a consumer fraud statute, nor should it matter that the 
statute makes Builder liable without fault. As Goldberg and Zipursky 
note, it is a virtue, not a flaw, of their theory that it can accommodate 
the “hodgepodge” of wrongs that comprise modern tort law, including 
torts that are wrongs without proof of wrongful intent or careless-
ness, such as trespass.33
 Furthermore, the fact that Inspector received some compensation 
for his aid to Homeowner is irrelevant. In this example, Inspector, in 
theory, received quantum meruit, although it is more common in cas-
es of maintenance for third parties who aided victims of wrongdoing 
to receive a share of the victim’s recovery. In the Nevada case upon 
which this example is based, the court held that a home inspector in 
Inspector’s shoes had acted illegally because he had “expended” his 
time in exchange for some portion of the recovery of the homeowners 
who brought (in theory) valid consumer claims against one of Neva-
da’s largest homebuilders.34
 Blackstone’s reasons for holding Inspector’s actions wrongful are 
not set out in great detail, but from a few sentences, we can glean at 
least one reason. The maintainer of lawsuits violates “public justice” 
because he “keeps alive strife and contention.”35 “These pests of civil 
society,” he says, “are perpetually endeavoring to disturb the repose 
of their neighbors, and officiously interfering in other men’s quar-
rels.”36 Blackstone’s reasons are not based on a fear that third-party 
assistance of litigation will increase frivolous or spurious litigation, 
as is the case with some modern critics of litigation finance.37 His 
                                                                                                                                        
civil proceedings if (a) he acts without probable cause, and primarily for a 
purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim in which 
the proceedings are based, and (b) except when they are ex parte, the proceedings 
have terminated in favor of the person against whom they are brought. 
Id. § 674. Although Chapter 30 is entitled “Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings” and restricts 
the tort of “malicious prosecution” to improper initiation of criminal proceedings, many 
courts refer to both wrongful use of either the criminal or the civil process as malicious 
prosecution, a convention adopted by this Article. See id. § 682 (“One who uses a legal 
process, whether criminal or civil, against another primarily to accomplish a purpose 
for which it is not designed, is subject to liability to the other for harm caused by the 
abuse of process.”); 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 
6:10 (2011 ed.) (stating that malicious prosecution derived from the torts of champerty 
and maintenance).
 33.    Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 951.
 34.    Del Webb, 2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 85616, at *15.
 35.    BLACKSTONE, supra note 4, at *135.
 36.    Id.
 37.    See Paul H. Rubin, On the Efficiency of Increasing Litigation 3 (Third Party Fin. of 
Litig. Roundtable, Searle Ctr., Northwestern. Univ. Law Sch. Sept. 24–25, 2009), available 
at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/jep/symposia/JEP_CJ_2009_Rubin.pdf (discussing the 
216 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol 39:209
stated concern about the “repose” of the maintainer’s neighbor might
be directed to the repose of Builder in my example, but it is not clear 
why Builder’s repose should count in Blackstone’s eyes. It is at least 
as plausible, if not more plausible, that Blackstone’s concern is for 
Homeowner, and Homeowner’s “repose.” 
 But what possible connection could there be between Homeowner’s 
“repose” and Homeowner’s claim against Builder? Before Inspector’s 
intervention, Homeowner was already suffering from the “setback” of 
a defect in his home.38 He knew of the defect. The only difference in 
Homeowner’s condition after Inspector’s intervention (other than the 
possible recovery of a remedy) was that Homeowner now knew that 
his setback was the result of a legal wronging, as opposed to a human 
act that was perhaps innocent, or if culpable, merely morally, not le-
gally culpable. Blackstone’s position that Inspector’s act was wrong-
ful is tantamount to saying that Builder ought not to be held liable to 
Inspector.39 Yet, other than some fear that the suit instigated by In-
spector is frivolous or spurious, which by definition is not true in this 
example, it is not clear why Builder ought not to be “vulnerable” to a 
claim by Homeowner. 
 Just as the Blackstonian objection identified above is not based on 
collateral concerns about frivolous litigation, it also is not based on 
collateral concerns about the possibility that Inspector has taken ad-
vantage of Homeowner (which would be ironic, given that Builder 
offered to help Homeowner recover under a consumer protection law). 
Modern criticisms of maintenance, especially when it involves “litiga-
tion finance” of consumers who have small personal injury claims, 
can sensibly be understood to be about the price of maintenance, not 
the practice itself.40 Yet, there have been other modern examples 
where, on the basis of a Blackstonian conception of maintenance, 
self-interested support by third parties of litigation has been declared 
illegal. For example, in Toste Farm Corp. v. Hadbury, Inc., the de-
fendant was a law firm that had negligently prepared legal docu-
                                                                                                                                        
external costs of allowing sale of legal claims, including increased litigation costs and 
inefficient substantive law).
 38.    “Torts . . . are wrongings. For every tort, there is an inquiry into the nature of the 
tortfeasor’s actions . . . , the nature of the setback suffered by the victim, and the connection 
between the two.” Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 944 (emphasis added).
 39.    In fact, in many jurisdictions that continue to accept the Blackstonian idea that 
maintenance is wrong, a defendant like Builder, who can prove that the suit against them 
is the consequence of a third party’s support of the plaintiff, can secure a dismissal of the 
suit against them.
 40.    See Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No.018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704, (N.Y. 
App. Div. March 2, 2005), in which the court voided a nonrecourse funding agreement on 
the ground that the payment by the litigant to the third party was noncontingent and was 
therefore a loan controlled by New York’s usury statute. The trial judge’s conclusion in 
Echeverria—that the investment by the funder was a usurious loan—was rejected in a 
subsequent proceeding in Plaintiff Funding Corporation d/b/a LawCash v. Echeverria,
No.10140/2005 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Kings, 2005).
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ments for a third party.41 The plaintiff was sued by the third party in 
a related matter. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant offered to 
finance the third party’s suit—including the legal fees of another law 
firm hired to prosecute the suit—in the hope that if the third party 
received a settlement from the suit “he would not pursue a malprac-
tice claim against” the defendant.42 The Rhode Island Supreme Court 
held that the law firm had committed maintenance, and it did not 
base its holding on whether the suit the defendant had encouraged 
its former client to pursue was meritless.43 In Oliver v. Bynum, a 
North Carolina court held that common law maintenance prohibited 
the gratuitous act of helping a party secure funding to mount a law-
suit because the maintainer desired to ruin the career of the person 
who would be named in the lawsuit.44 Again, the court did not focus 
on the merits of the suit brought by the party aided by the maintain-
er (the implication was that the suit had merit). It focused only on 
the motive of the maintainer and the effects of his aid, which the 
court found was for the purpose of “stirring up strife and continuing 
litigation.”45 Why, in each of these cases, if the party aided by the 
maintainer truly suffered a wrong, should it matter why or how it 
came to pass that the wrong was redressed, as long as no deceit or 
duress was employed by the maintainer? 
III.   WRONGINGS AND RESENTMENT
 One possible interpretation of Blackstone’s position, read through 
the more sophisticated terminology of Goldberg and Zipursky, is that 
Builder ought to be vulnerable to a suit by Homeowner if Builder has 
satisfied the criteria of a relational wrong, and one critical feature of 
a injurious act that is a wronging is that it is a mistreating of the vic-
tim by the tortfeasor.46 As Goldberg and Zipursky put it, “From the 
plaintiff’s perspective, it is not correct to say that there just happens 
to have been a conjunction of her loss and wrongful conduct by the 
defendant: In her eyes the defendant’s wrong is mistreating her.”47
Blackstone might be making a simple but understandable error. He 
might assume that, while Builder may have acted wrongfully (by not 
building the house without a defect), and Homeowner suffered a loss 
(the defect), there was no “conjunction” between the wrongful act and 
                                                          
 41.  798 A.2d 901 (R.I. 2002).
 42.    Id. at 904.
 43.    Id. at 906. The plaintiff in the suit had alleged that the suit was meritless, but it 
must be noted that the client had found a law firm (not the defendant) willing to file the 
suit, and there was no suggestion that the second suit had violated its obligations under 
Rhode Island’s rules of professional responsibility. Id.
 44.    592 S.E.2d 707, 711 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
 45.    Id.
 46.    Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 943.
 47.    Id. (emphasis added).
218 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol 39:209
the loss since Homeowner did not experience the conjunction of the 
wrongful act and the loss as a mistreatment. Blackstone’s point here 
is not that Inspector ought not to have “disturbed Homeowner’s re-
pose” by making his life more complicated than it had been before 
(before Inspector showed up, Homeowner would not have had to worry 
about whether to sue Builder). The world was in repose before In-
spector showed up. There had been no wronging of Homeowner, not-
withstanding Homeowner’s loss in the world, because Homeowner 
had no awareness of having been mistreated, as opposed to merely 
having been treated by Builder’s act, which was conjoined in time 
and space with the fact of a loss (the defect). 
 Before I address the obvious objections to Blackstone’s argument, 
I would like to observe that there is a way in which Goldberg and 
Zipursky’s language invites the peculiar view that an attribute of a 
relational wrong is the experience of mistreatment of the victim by 
the tortfeasor. The idea that a tort is a mistreatment of the victim by 
the tortfeasor is a major, if underdeveloped, theme throughout their 
writings. The term “mistreatment” (or some variation of the term) 
appears frequently in Torts as Wrongs.48 The verb “mistreat” is more 
than a transitive verb (x mistreats y); rather, it implies an expressive 
act. The difference between mistreating someone and treating them 
in a way that results in a setback in their lives is the meaning of the 
act in its doing. While in everyday language we might take “mis-
treatment” to be a result of the meaning invested in an act by its do-
er, that is almost certainly not what Goldberg and Zipursky mean. 
After all, one of the hallmarks of their theory, and its chief virtue, is 
that it refuses to cut off the diversity of torts in the common law or 
force them, in a Procrustean fashion, into a single moralized concep-
tion.49 They accept that certain acts, such as trespass, which do not 
convey a culpable state of mind (and hence express no desire to 
“treat” the victim at all), are nonetheless torts and can be actions 
which mistreat the victim.  
                                                          
 48.    “In her eyes the defendant’s wrong is mistreating her . . . .” Id. at 943 (emphasis 
added). “Historically, in a case in which a tortfeasor’s carelessness toward the plaintiff 
combined with another's intentional mistreatment of the plaintiff . . . .” Id. at 967 
(emphasis added). “[T]ort law as a law of wrongs guides conduct and protects individuals 
against mistreatment by others.” Id. at 972 (emphasis added). “[T]ort law identifies and 
enjoins actions that constitute mistreatments of others” Id. at 973. “[W]hen a tort is 
committed—the victim of the mistreatment not only has suffered a setback in the eyes of 
the law . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). “[A]s a law of wrongs, it guides conduct by reference to 
. . . and enforces duties not mistreat others.” Id. at 975 (emphasis added). “[T]he idea of 
legal wrongs helps to explain in what sense tort law recognizes responsibilities not to 
mistreat others . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). “[Law of wrongs] confers upon each of us duties 
not to mistreat others in various ways and rights not to be so mistreated.” Id. at 981 
(emphasis added). “[T]he idea that there is not a class or group of persons who are 
somehow entitled to mistreat another . . . .” Id. at 982 (emphasis added). And “[i]n tort [law], 
wrongs are violations of legal norms not to mistreat others.” Id. at 986 (emphasis added). 
 49.  Id. at 977. 
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 A tortfeasor’s action possesses the attribute of mistreatment be-
cause the victim experiences it as such. This is why, for example, vic-
tims are right, say Goldberg and Zipursky, to “resent” the doer of a 
legally wrongful act more if the act, as a matter of luck, causes the 
victim injury than if, as a result of moral luck, it causes the victim no 
setback at all:  
To say that an actor could reasonably be resented to a greater de-
gree is not to say that there was some respect in which the actor’s 
conduct ought to be deemed more wrongful; on the other hand, in-
creased blameworthiness in the sense of increased grounds for re-
sentment may indeed be an attribute of the actor’s actions. . . .50
 And so, Blackstone might conclude, where there is no experience 
of mistreatment and no resentment, the doer’s act lacks an attribute 
that makes it wrongful. It is not relational in the correct way. A rela-
tion may exist nonetheless from the perspective of moral theory (un-
der some moral theories Builder may still owe Homeowner some kind 
of debt), but it is not relational in the way required by private law 
theory. The “repose” disturbed by Inspector, under this reading of 
Torts as Wrongs, is the repose of the relationship between Builder 
and Homeowner as citizens. While there could have been, under al-
ternate contingent conditions, a wrong between them in the world 
(for example, had Homeowner on his own investigated and pursued 
his consumer claim), as it was, when Inspector entered the scene, 
there was no wrong as between Builder and Homeowner. Inspector, 
so to speak, created it. 
 The obvious response to this Blackstonian interpretation of what 
it means for a doer to mistreat a victim in the law of wrongs is that it 
misapprehends how the doer’s act ripens into a mistreatment of the 
victim. A victim of an act can be mistreated even if they are not 
aware of the true expressive content of the doer’s act at the time of 
the mistreating. The victim of a fraud may be pleased by the flatter-
ing lies of the fraudster, but the mistreating of the victim inheres in 
the fraudster’s conduct at the moment the misrepresentations are 
uttered. But, even that counterexample is not as simple as it looks. In 
moral theory, it may be the case that a lie is a mistreatment of the 
person to whom it is directed at the very moment it is uttered, but 
that is partly because it is an intentional misrepresentation, and the 
expressive content of the act is supplied by the speaker’s active intent 
to treat the recipient of the misrepresentation poorly. What about 
acts, such as those which tort law treats as wrongs (and which may 
not be wrongs in moral theory), such as Builder’s, where the attribute 
of mistreatment comes entirely from the conjunction of a setback in 
the interests of the victim conjoined with the fact that the law has 
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imposed on Builder a duty to repair, regardless of Builder’s expres-
sive attitude towards Homeowner when Builder’s actions failed to 
conform to the law’s requirements? 
 Here Goldberg and Zipursky can point out that Homeowner’s lack 
of subjective experience of mistreatment is irrelevant, even to Home-
owner. Homeowner does not want to live his life based on mistaken 
premises; his larger life plan must include, it is safe to assume, a 
general commitment to engaging the world as it really is. It is not 
hard to see that the mistreatment of victims in the sorts of cases de-
scribed in my example is counterfactual: If Homeowner knew the 
truth about the world (that Law L had been violated by Builder), 
then Homeowner would feel resentful towards Builder. That is why 
the victim’s resentment matters in capturing what is relational in the 
legal wrong committed by Builder. It is not just what the victim feels 
when a tortfeasor acts in violation of a legal norm and causes the vic-
tim a setback, it is, as Goldberg and Zipursky put it in the quote 
above, what the victim would “reasonably” feel if all the facts were 
known to the victim. 
 I have no quarrel with this obvious response by Goldberg and 
Zipursky to Blackstone as to why it does not make sense to say, un-
der the theory of torts as wrongs, that no wronging has occurred in 
the example I offer, and why, further, it is nonsense to say that it is 
Inspector’s act of introducing true facts of the world to Homeowner 
that “disturbs the repose” of the world (whatever that is supposed to 
mean) and not Builder’s original act of failing to conform his actions 
to Law L which created the legal wrong sought to be remedied by 
Homeowner after Inspector’s intervention. My concern is with some-
thing else—with the new fact that drives the counterfactual account 
of resentment. 
 The victim who learns about the true facts of the world and who 
reasonably would feel resentment towards a tortfeasor does not learn 
any new facts about the loss that they have suffered in the world. In 
my example, Homeowner always knew that he had a defect in his 
home. Any facts about that defect that Homeowner learned from In-
spector unrelated to the existence of Law L and his right to recover 
under it he could have learned on his own without also learning that 
Builder had wronged Homeowner. Similarly, in Tort and Moral Luck,
Goldberg and Zipursky note that victims who may have a right to 
redress are fully aware of the setbacks they suffer at the hands of 
those who may be vulnerable to a legal action before they know that 
they have been wronged.51 The driver who has been hit by another 
                                                          
 51.   John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1155 (2007).
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driver “heedlessly drifting into [his] lane”52 or the patient who has 
suffered an adverse result at the hands of a “great doctor and a de-
cent, well-meaning person” feels resentment at the moment of inju-
ry.53 They may even feel mistreated. But none of those subjective feel-
ings count towards why they have been wronged from a torts per-
spective. The actions of the tortfeasors who struck the driver and who 
harmed the patient possessed the necessary attribute of mistreat-
ment because they failed to conform to the standards of conduct im-
posed upon drivers and doctors by law, not because they produced in 
their victims a sense of generalized resentment. 
 Seen from this perspective, we can see that Homeowner in my ex-
ample is not so different from almost all tort victims. Few, if any, vic-
tims of a tortfeasor’s wronging know sufficient facts and law to real-
ize that their setback was the result of the violation of a legal norm 
when it occurred. They may form that belief over time—first as a 
suspicion that leads them to a lawyer (which may or may not be well 
grounded) and then, if the system works properly, as a belief reason-
ably grounded in fact and law as the procedures of litigation grind 
forward. If the proper ground for finding a relational wrong between 
victim and tortfeasor is the mistreatment of the former by the latter 
as a matter of tort law, then all victims’ feelings of mistreatment by 
tortfeasors, as experienced by the victims, are counterfactual. 
IV.   MISTREATMENT AT VIOLATION OF LAW
 The conclusion drawn in the last section—that in all cases of “tort 
wrongs,” the victim’s initial feeling of resentment or mistreatment is 
counterfactual—is not a problem for Goldberg and Zipursky, but ra-
ther a virtue. It is important to recall that a separate problem they 
attempt to resolve is the “Moral-Legal Dilemma,” which is simply 
that, as an interpretive matter, tort law seems to be either overinclu-
sive or rooted in a crude form of positivism.54 Either whole chunks of 
tort doctrine which do not seem to be rooted in modern moral theory 
(such as trespass, which is liability without fault based on a crude 
property fetishism) or the concept of “wrong” in tort is “vacuous,” 
since “a legal wrong [is] anything the law defines as a legal wrong.”55
 Goldberg and Zipursky’s solution is to note that the concept of 
wrong can be normatively rich without being coextensive with social 
morality; that is, they see tort law as “a domain of duty-imposing le-
gal directives” whose source happens to be the sort of legal sources 
identified by Hart: “The fact that an act falls under an authoritative 
                                                          
 52.  Id. at 1155. 
 53.   Id. at 1162.
 54.    Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 947-48.
 55.    Id. at 948.
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legal directive that characterizes it as a legal wrong does not entail 
that such an act, in the circumstances it actually occurred, warrants 
categorization as morally wrongful.”56
 In a sense, the word wrong used in law is like the sense that one 
uses the word wrong in a game like chess. It is wrong to move a rook 
diagonally, even if it is by no means immoral. Goldberg and Zipursky 
could complain that this is too crude and too positivist an under-
standing of their use of Hart. Hart understood that legal systems, as 
well as other practices, could impose duties based on principles as 
well as rules.57 Even were one to concede the point that chess does 
not resemble “a domain of duty-imposing directives” like law,58 since 
so many of the rules require no interpretation, one could imagine ar-
guments in games like chess that are resolved only by reference to 
principles drawn from the authoritative directives that govern the 
game (for example, is it wrong to stare at one’s opponent in chess?).59
In either case (the simple rule violation or the violation of a principle 
embedded in the game), the word “wrong” is used the same way it is 
used by Goldberg and Zipursky in their theory of torts as wrongs. 
The reason the victim of a car accident resulting from careless driv-
ing can say that she has suffered a wrong (and is entitled to redress) 
is because the driver who harmed her violated a directive in law, not 
because it may be, as a contingent matter, morally wrong to drive 
without reasonable care. 
 This brings me finally to a feature of the concept of mistreatment 
used in Goldberg and Zipursky’s theory. The counterfactual account 
of mistreatment is dynamic. Except for those highly unusual victims 
who know the law and are confident of the facts, their feelings of re-
sentment, if they have any, are based on some spurious nonlegal 
ground. If they grow confident of the facts and are told by a lawyer 
(or a court) that their injurer violated a legal norm, only then do they 
have a reason to feel resentment because they have suffered a wrong 
in tort. In other words, the new fact that the victims learn that al-
lows them to feel mistreated qua tort law is that the defendant did 
not conform his conduct to a legal norm. That new fact is what war-
rants the sense of mistreatment which explains why the tortfeasor 
should be vulnerable to the victim in the various ways provided by 
our tort system. Goldberg and Zipursky say as much in this passage: 
                                                          
 56.    See id. at 950-51.
 57.    See ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 78 (1998).
 58.  Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 951.
 59.    This example is drawn from Dworkin, although I do not think that Dworkin draws 
the proper conclusion from it. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 102 (1978); see
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[A]ssuming that the increased resentment felt by the victim is not 
itself to be converted into an attribution of greater blameworthiness 
to the author of the injurious act, tort law helps us to see a distinct 
but related point . . . . A heightened degree of blameworthiness 
does not necessarily entail an increased level of wrongfulness, 
but it may reflect an increase in the level of blame by others to
which a third party (like the state) would regard the wrongdoer as 
properly vulnerable.60
 This passage begins with the concession, noted above, that at the 
point of interaction between victim and tortfeasor, the victim’s sub-
jective experience of resentment towards the defendant, while often 
present, need not be. This is true because the victims’ subjective ex-
perience of anything other than legal mistreatment is utterly irrele-
vant to the question of whether a tort-wrong occurred. The experience 
of mistreatment that is always present (or at least constructively 
present) is when the victim learns the facts necessary to establish a 
violation of law that harmed her. Any subjective resentment that the 
victim might feel based on her own metric of blameworthiness is 
mere noise; that is not why she is warranted to seek redress. The fact 
that “the state” treats the act that caused the setback as blamewor-
thy is all that matters. That fact, conjoined with her injury, provides 
the proper motivation to the victim to resent the defendant and also 
allows us to explain why the defendant has wronged her as a matter 
of tort law. 
 I would, therefore, amend the following statement by Goldberg 
and Zipursky, which they make in the context of explaining why the 
victim of a completed tortious act is justified in blaming the tortfea-
sor, while someone who luckily escaped harm would lack any justifi-
cation for blame in tort:  
In all [cases like the driver and the patient], victims appropriately 
and reasonably feel mistreated and not just because they are part 
of a society with a legal system that dubs these acts as wrongs. All 
of the victims have been injured in a way that warrants their 
thinking that someone else is responsible for mistreating them and 
that their wrongdoer is an appropriate person from whom to de-
mand redress or satisfaction.61
Goldberg and Zipursky are right that wrongful action is not enough 
to comprise mistreatment in tort. There must be a completed harm, 
too (no “negligence in the air,” so to speak). But to the extent that 
this passage implies that there is some reason, independent of law, 
that underwrites the injured victim’s sense of resentment towards 
the defendant, this implication should be resisted, for it is undercut 
                                                          
 60.    Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 944 (emphasis added).
 61.    Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 51, at 1162.
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by other parts of their argument. The victim’s “right” to resent the 
defendant is not based on their own self-interest; they already knew 
that their interest had been rendered a setback when the accident 
first occurred, and as demonstrated above, that was not enough to 
warrant a feeling of mistreatment in tort. 
 It would seem to me that the only reason that these victims have a 
right to feel mistreated is because they are “part” of a legal system 
that has stipulated that, under certain conditions, the norms of the 
legal system have been violated. In the case of tort, there are two 
conditions—the violation of a norm and the causation of an injury. 
Once those conditions are satisfied, the victim is then authorized to 
act on behalf of the legal system. When the victim acts to secure re-
dress, it is the wrong done to the legal system that provides as condi-
tion precedent for the wrong to the victim. This is a small and per-
haps subtle difference, but one which is worth emphasizing. Under 
Goldberg and Zipursky’s theory of torts as wrongs, the concept of 
wrong is presented as an intuitive, almost irreducible normative in-
terest on the part of victim. This is reflected in Torts as Wrongs when 
they say “[t]ortious wrongdoing always involves an interference with 
one of a set of individual interests . . . tort law does not vindicate pub-
lic or communal interests.”62 Yet, upon closer inspection, it turns out 
that tort law is not grounded in “individual interests,” except to the 
extent that the legal system chooses to use individuals to bear its 
own interest—which is to have its norms enforced. I am not sure that 
this is a weakness in the theory of torts as wrongs, but it does high-
light how much the content of “wronging” in torts is based not on the 
interests individuals have, but on the interest of the legal system, 
which may only contingently reflect a commitment to individual 
rights, interests, or dignity. 
 From this perspective it is easy to see how Blackstone’s rejection 
of maintenance is quite inconsistent with the theory of torts as 
wrongs. It would seem that the legal system would have an interest 
in violations of its norms being identified, regardless of who identi-
fied them or the motivation behind the identification (assuming, of 
course, that the incentives did not induce third parties to engage in 
fraud or harassment). Goldberg and Zipursky’s theory of torts as 
wrongs seems not only indifferent to the concerns of Blackstone but 
also to positively reject them. Can anything be said, therefore, for 
Blackstone’s view? Does it illuminate a weakness in the version of 
torts as wrongs endorsed by Goldberg and Zipursky and, implicitly, 
by all those who support open and unfettered markets for third-party 
investment in litigation? This is a difficult question, for it might 
simply be the case that Blackstone was incapable of seeing beyond 
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his own preliberal prejudices—that is, he was in the grips of the sort 
of suspicion of litigation identified by Radin. On the other hand, it 
might be the case that Blackstone’s conception of the right to redress 
had a different understanding of wrongs than the conception at the 
heart of Goldberg and Zipursky’s theory. That would explain his oth-
erwise inexplicable resistance to maintenance, and why he could not 
see that the involvement by strangers in the identification and re-
dress of wrongs would be a natural extension of his embrace of the 
idea of torts as redress for private wrongs. What that conception of 
the right to redress might look like, and how it would differ from 
Goldberg and Zipursky’s, remains to be examined in another article.63
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